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Economic  Hysteresis  and the Effects  of
Output Regulation
Timothy J. Richards
Economic  hysteresis,  the  continuation  of a  phenomenon  after  its initial  cause has
disappeared, represents  an alternative theoretical explanation  for the fixed-asset prob-
lem. When  a  set of fixed assets  includes  quota licenses,  hysteresis in license invest-
ment leads to distortions that have not been measured in the policy analysis literature.
A  model  of economic  "friction"  tests the  effect  of hysteresis  in  Alberta  dairy  in-
vestment.  Estimates  of investment  functions  show  that  desired  investment  (disin-
vestment)  must  be  significantly  greater  (less) than  zero  before  any  action  is  taken.
Because  cattle and quota are  often purchased  together, the relatively long periods  of
no change in quota holdings that result from hysteresis cause similar periods in which
herds  neither grow nor contract.
Key  words:  Alberta,  dairy,  dynamic  duality,  fixed asset,  hysteresis,  option  value,
supply management
Introduction
Economists  often blame  the periodic  overproduction  of agricultural  commodities on in-
puts  that become  "locked  in"  to  production  or the  fixed-asset problem.  Several  expla-
nations  for the fixed-asset  phenomenon  exist, but few consider output regulation's  role.
The usual rationale  uses  Johnson's  argument  that  agricultural  inputs  have  low  salvage
values  relative  to production  values,  so  large price reductions  must  occur to  cause dis-
investment.  More  recently, Hsu  and  Chang show  that, when  investment  is costly, a dif-
ference between  the costs  of investment  and disinvestment  will cause asset fixity.
Though these and  other  studies  establish a  strong  theoretical  basis  for the fixed-asset
problem,  there  is  only  limited  empirical  evidence  that  it  indeed  exists.  For  example,
Chambers  and Vasavada  fail to find  any  fixity in the  aggregate  use of capital, materials,
and  energy  in  U.S.  agriculture.  On  the  other  hand,  Nelson,  Braden,  and  Roh  find that
farmers  are more.reluctant to part with tractors than to acquire  them in response to price
changes.  Although  Chang  and  Stefanou's  study  of Pennsylvania  dairy  shows  that  in-
vestment  and  disinvestment  occur at significantly  different  rates, their inputs  are quasi-
fixed,  or  adjust slowly,  rather  than truly  fixed.  Clearly,  there  is  a need  to  both  explain
and  test for true  asset fixity within a  single  theoretical  framework.
A better  empirical  approach  to  studying  the fixed-asset  problem  will help  determine
the  effects  of farm  policy  on the reluctance  of farm  inputs  to  leave  production.  In par-
ticular,  this problem  may prove to be  most  acute  in the  case  of Canadian  dairy  policy.
If U.S. challenges to Canada's tariffication  of its dairy import quotas are successful,  then
the Canadian  industry will face intense  international  competition.  The consequent  ratio-
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nalization  of the  Canadian  dairy  industry  will be  especially  difficult  if herd  sizes  are
slower  to  adjust  as  a result  of supply  management.  Therefore,  this  study considers  the
possibility  that the quota licenses  used in  conjunction  with Canadian  dairy supply  man-
agement  are  indeed  fixed  inputs  and, through  their  complementarity  with  other  inputs,
slow the rate of cattle  disinvestment  and operator exit.
This  treatment  of quota licenses  is  unlike previous  work  in  which  quota  is regarded
as a strict  limit to output (Moschini;  Stefanou et al.). Rather,  supply management  simply
creates  another  asset in which  farmers must  invest. For example,  Alberta  dairy  farmers
accumulate licenses  gradually  through  the quota  exchange.1 Once  purchased,  producers
are reluctant  to sell licenses to  meet short-term  production fluctuations,  because it takes
too long to  repurchase  them should the  need arise in  the future. Despite managing milk
supply,  both production  and net returns  to dairy  in Alberta  remain highly  variable.
Given  the uncertainty  in  input  costs  and  milk production,  this  study  develops  a  test
for quota fixity based on recent innovations in the investment-under-uncertainty  literature.
Research  by Dixit  (1992)  and  Chavas  suggests  that  the fixed-asset  problem  may result
from economic hysteresis.  Hysteresis, or the continuation of a phenomenon after its initial
cause has disappeared, means that investments in dairy cows, quota, or other fixed inputs
are  slow to exit once returns have fallen.  This is due  to the possibility,  however remote,
that  returns  will  one  day  rise  enough  to justify  owning  the  asset  once  again.  In  fact,
several  authors  (Brennan  and  Schwartz;  McDonald  and  Siegel;  Dixit  1989,  1991a,  b,
1992; Pindyck;  Chavas;  and many others)  argue that  classical investment  decision rules
no longer apply  when  investment returns  are  inherently  unstable  and  there  are  sunk or
transaction  costs of investment.  When returns in the future  are  uncertain,  an opportunity
to wait  and  see  what the  future  will bring has  some  value.  This  is  the option  value of
an  opportunity  to  make  an  investment.  Once  the  investment  is  made,  its  option  value
disappears,  so  the  returns  to  an  investment  must  cover  both  its  financial  cost  and  the
option  value.  This  extra  hurdle  means  that  returns  will vary  over  a  far broader  range
than the classical rules suggest before investment (or disinvestment) is a rational decision.
As potential investors wait for the higher (or lower) return levels to be reached, observed
investment  or  disinvestment  will  not  respond  to  small  changes  in  returns.  This  is the
phenomenon of hysteresis  or the fixed-asset  problem.
The objectives  of this  study  are  to  determine  both  the  direct  effect  of hysteresis  on
quota  license  investment  and  the  indirect  effect  of quota  hysteresis  on  investments  in
other  quasi-fixed  inputs.  Farm-level  data from  Alberta  dairy producers  show  how  hys-
teresis  in  quota investment  can result in  unexpected  economic  consequences.  This  em-
pirical  problem is  of interest to economists  studying  agricultural  investment  since most
previous research about hysteresis in investment  has been on a theoretical  level using ex
ante  simulations  instead  of applied  (for example,  Dixit  1989;  Purvis et al.).
Estimates of a system of interrelated investment  functions measure the indirect effects
of requiring  investment  in  quota  licenses.  Other  empirical  dairy  studies  (Weersink  and
Howard;  Chang and  Stefanou;  Tsigas  and Hertel) all show that investment  in one quasi-
fixed  input  will  affect  investment  in  all  other  inputs.  As  a  result  of this  interaction,
hysteresis  in quota investment  causes  slow adjustment  in the  other inputs.
1 In Canada, fluid milk production  is regulated on a provincial  basis. Marketing  quotas limit provincial supply to an amount
that will allow  the  market to clear  at a formula  determined price.  Although the system is under  revision, quota is currently
traded in  a formal,  monthly,  mail-based  exchange.  Quota  purchased through  the exchange is allocated on a pro rata basis to
all bidders  meeting  the ask price.  Often, this means  that buyers  only obtain a fraction of the  amount they require  so it may
take  significant time to accumulate  the desired amount.
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Theoretical Model  of Hysteresis in Investment
According  to  standard  investment  theory,  a  firm  should  only  invest  in  a  project  when
the discounted  value  of cash flows exceeds  the initial investment  costs.  So, expansion  or
entry  will  only occur if the net  present value  of doing  so is positive.  If the  price  (cash
flow)  rises  above  the  minimum average  total  cost (cost of entry),  then  a firm  enters the
industry  or exits the industry in the short run if price falls below the minimum of average
variable  cost.  In a perfectly  competitive  industry,  this  means  that free  entry  to  and exit
from  an industry causes  the price  to  equal the minimum  of long-run  average cost.
These classical  rules  of entry  and exit  are misleading  when  the cash flows  are  inher-
ently  uncertain,  and the entry  or exit decision entails  significant sunk costs.  Specifically,
when  cash flows  are  uncertain  and an investment  or disinvestment involves  a sunk cost,
then there is  a positive value to waiting to take  advantage  of an opportunity  to do either.
This  value  is  an  option  value  akin  to  the  value  of  an  option  on  a  financial  stock.  For
example,  if there  is  a  50%  chance  that  returns  to an  investment  next period will cause
the  net present  value  to  be  $10,  and  a  50%  chance  that  it will be  -$10,  the  ability  to
delay  the  investment  allows the  investor to  avoid the  downside  risk. In this  simple  ex-
ample,  the  expected  value  of waiting  to  commit,  or  the  option  value, is  $5.  This  logic
is  clear in Dixit's (1989)  entry/exit  example.
Assume  that  a  firm is the  only  one  with an  entry  opportunity.  For  simplicity's  sake,
also assume that once the firm enters  it cannot  exit.  If entry entails a fixed  cost of k and
returns  net revenues  of R,  then, assuming  an interest rate of r,  the classical rule implies
that  entry is profitable  when the value  of an active firm is merely greater than the entry
costs.  Or,  if  V(R)  is  the  maximized  net  present  value  of the  firm  as  a  function  of net
revenues,  entry  occurs  when  this  value is  positive:  V(R)  = Rlr  - k  >  0. This  rule no
longer applies  under uncertainty  and  sunk costs.
Uncertainty  enters  the  model by letting  net  revenues  be random.  Following  the  deri-
vation of Dixit (1992),  R follows  a geometric Brownian motion with a trend growth rate
(/,)  and a  variance  (o2t) proportional  to  the level of revenues  as  in:
dR
(1)  -dR = u dt +  ao  dM.
R
Through  V(R),  equation  (1)  defines  how  firm value changes  over  time.
An  investor will be indifferent  to investing  or waiting  to invest  in a  firm  only if the
value  of waiting  is  equal  to  the  return  from  owning  an  active  firm  over  that  period.2
Applying  Ito's lemma to equation  (1) provides  an expression for expected gain to owning
an  active firm:
(2)  E[dV]  =  V'(R),uR  dt +  (1/2)V"(R)o2R2 dt +  o dt,
where  the higher order terms  of the Taylor expansion,  o dt,  are subsequently  ignored.
In equilibrium,  the  expected  capital  gain,  E[dV],  is  equal to  the  annual return  on the
value  of the  firm,  rV(R)  dt.  Dividing  the  equilibrium  expression  by  dt  and  taking  the
limit  as dt -> 0 provides a differential  equation that describes  the behavior of firm value
in net  revenues:
2 This  derivation  closely follows  Dixit (1992),  where  the appendix  provides greater  detail on  the solution  method.
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(3)  V'(R)IR  + (1/2)V"(R)OR 2 - rV(R)  = 0.
The expression for  V(R)  that  solves this  differential  equation will be  of the form V(R)
=  Rx.  Substituting this  expression  for V(R)  in (3)  yields a quadratic  equation  in x:
(4)  XJL  +  (/2)x(x  - l)r 2 - r  =  0.
Equation  (4)  has  two  possible  solutions  for x-let them be  a  and  b.  The solution  a
must  be  negative  and  b must  be  greater than  one  to  ensure that  the  firm  value  has  an
upper  bound.  Therefore,  the  solution  for  V(R)  becomes  V(R)  = ARa  +  BR b, but  as  R
goes  to  zero,  the  value  of waiting  must  go  to  zero,  so  A  =  0  and  the  only  possible
solution becomes  V(R)  = BRb. Using  (4) to  solve for b gives
(5)  b  (1/2)[1  +  Vl  + 8r/cm] >  1.
This  solution for b shows  the difference between the level of returns that would cause
investment under the usual rules, M,  and the  "trigger"  level  of returns that includes the
option value,  H. An  investor will enter if revenues are above  H but not enter if they are
below H. If the value of the firm is  given by the  value of waiting  when the firm is idle
and the value  of investing  when the  firm enters, then it must be true that
[BR b,  R  H
(6)  V(R)=  R/r-k,  R  H'
Because the  value  of the firm must  be continuous  in  net revenues,  the  slope  of each
component  of the function  V(R)  in (6)  must be the same  at the trigger price,  H. This  is
known  as the  smooth pasting  condition. Intuitively,  the smooth-pasting  condition  means
that,  in  order to maximize  the value  of the  firm, the  potential entrant must  wait until R
is  high  enough  to  cause  the marginal  value  of waiting  to  equal  the  marginal  value  of
current profits  forgone, or 1/r = bBHb-'. Furthermore,  the value  of a firm that does enter
can only differ from one that does not by the amount  of entry costs, k, so Hlr = BRb  +
k. Solving  these two equations  for H produces
b
(7)  H = kr
while M = kr.  Because  b  >  1 by assumption,  this  result means  the  true entry  level of
R must be greater than the usual level,  M,  by a factor  of bl(b - 1).
This  logic  is shown through  a simple  diagram.  Figure  1 shows  how  the option  value
causes the hysteresis. At the level of returns, H, traditional  investment rules indicate that
IM  should be the appropriate level of investment.  However,  if the total costs of investing
include  the  option  value,3 H is the  threshold  above  which  investment  begins.  The  dif-
ference  between  IM  and  0  is, therefore,  a  graphical  measure  of the effect  of hysteresis.
While  the option  value  is unobserved,  its effect  on the  "hysteresis  gap"  is readily  ob-
servable.
Although  the above  illustration  shows that hysteresis  can  theoretically  affect the  de-
cision  to  invest in  a  dairy  farm,  substituting  representative  values  of b  into  (7)  shows
that the expected effect  is far from trivial.  Using realistic values  of net revenue variance
and  the  discount rate  into the  solution  for b  above  yields  a  value  of 2.66.  This  means
3  If the total  costs of investment include  the option  value,  they are termed  the  "full costs"  of investing.
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Figure 1.  Hysteresis  effect  on quota license  investment
that the value  of H must be over twice  that of M in  order to justify entry  into the dairy
industry and,  thereby,  to justify investment in  quota.4
The size of this difference  means that returns can vary over a wide range before  actual
investment  or disinvestment takes place.  It is this sluggishness  in the face of significant
revenue variation  that we observe  and interpret  as  hysteresis.  On a theoretical  level, the
above  example  shows  that  the  value  of b  can  significantly  influence  investment  rates,
but it is an empirical  question  as  to whether  it can be interpreted  as  an explanation  for
quota fixity. 5
Previous  empirical  analyses  of dairy  investment  behavior  typically  estimate  smooth,
symmetric  investment  demand  functions  derived  from  a cost-of-adjustment  framework
(for example, Howard  and Shumway;  Weersink  and Howard;  Chang and Stefanou). The
4 The rate  of return  is assumed to  be the  average  return on  equity to dairy farms  over the  sample  period chosen  for this
study (1975-91)  which  was  11.7%.  The proportional  standard  deviation of fluid quota prices  over this period was  23%.
5 Most of the analysis  conducted with respect  to investment  or capacity choice  has used the example  of an individual firm
with a unique  opportunity to  invest.  However,  if many identical firms hold  the same right to invest in an industry producing
a homogeneous  output, then the time value of waiting to invest is bid to zero.  However,  this does  not invalidate  the hysteresis
result. As  shown  by Leahy,  a competitive  firm contemplating  entry  at the upper-bound  price  will still wait to invest because
the expected value  of operating returns  at that level  is  still negative-the price cannot  go above the upper threshold but can
go below.
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following  section  develops  an empirical  model of Alberta  fluid milk production  which,
while retaining the cost-of-adjustment  approach as its basis, relaxes the usual assumptions
of smooth and symmetric  investment. Without these restrictions,  this approach  is able  to
estimate  the effect of hysteresis  on quota investment.
Empirical Model  of Hysteresis
To estimate the actual quota investment demand function shown in figure  1, the empirical
procedure  must  differentiate  between  regimes  of positive  investment,  negative  invest-
ment,  and  no  change  in  quota  holdings.  While  this  will  measure  the  direct  effect  of
hysteresis,  the  approach  must  also  be  able  to  estimate  the  indirect  effects  of quota's
interaction  with the  other inputs. These requirements  suggest  a two-stage procedure.  In
the first stage,  partitioning the data set into regimes  of positive, negative, and zero quota
investment  permits  consistent estimation  of the hysteresis  gap  (IM  - 0)  for both  invest-
ment and  disinvestment.  In the  second stage,  simultaneous  estimation of output supply,
variable  input  demand,  and  investment  demand measure  the effect  of quota  adjustment
on  changes  in the other quasi-fixed  inputs, including the hysteresis  gap. Partitioning the
data in  this  way  also  allows  for the possibility  that  the  investment  demand  parameters
differ between quota investment  and disinvestment regimes. Despite these modifications,
the cost-of-adjustment  assumption  remains at the core  of the procedure.
Lucas and  Mortensen,  among others,  develop the cost-of-adjustment  model of invest-
ment.  This  model  assumes  that  investing  in  certain  inputs  is  costly.  Installing  capital
equipment, hiring  and training  skilled  labor, or breeding  and raising  dairy  cattle  are  all
examples  of milk production  inputs  with  high  acquisition  costs.  Because  the  costs  of
investing rise in the rate  of investment,6 it is rarely optimal to instantaneously  adjust the
levels of these inputs  to their desired levels,  so their  rey  are  called quasi-fixed.
Early  empirical  applications  of the cost-of-adjustment  model use  a primal  estimation
method that restricts  th  r  cts  e  analysis  to  a single  investment  demand equation.  The dynamic
dual  method  of Epstein  avoids  this limitation.  The  dynamic  dual  approach  uses  an in-
tertemporal analogue  of Hotelling's lemma  to  derive  a  system of output supply,  invest-
ment demand,  and  variable  input demand  equations  from a  dual value function.  Simul-
taneously  estimating  this  system provides  estimates  of the  effect  of investment  in  any
quasi-fixed input upon  any  other.
Previous  studies use either a quadratic  or generalized  Leontief functional form for the
value  function.  Based  upon  the  findings  of Howard  and  Shumway,  this  study  uses  the
generalized  Leontief functional  form  to estimate  the  output  supply, input  demand,  and
investment  demand parameters:7
6 In other  words,  the  investment  cost function  is assumed  to  be convex.  If C(I) is  the cost  of an investment  rate  I, then
convexity implies  that C(l) > 0,  and C"(I) > 0.
7As  suggested  by  Larson,  this value  function  describes  a problem  that  is dependent  upon time  (nonautonomous)  where
the producer  expects  continuous  technical  change  over the  entire period.  Although producers  expect technology to  be con-
tinually changing,  they do  not form expectations  of future prices. Such price expectations  imply that  "current relative prices
...  are  expected  to persist  indefinitely.  As  the base  period  changes  and new  prices  ...  are  observed,  the  firm revises  its
expectations  and  its previous  plans.  Thus  only  the t  = 0  portion  of the  plan  ...  is carried  out in general."  (Epstein  and
Denny,  p. 650).  Moreover,  the  generalized  Leontief  value function  maintains  an  assumption  that the  shadow value  of each
quasi-fixed  input  does  not change  as  more  is  acquired  (V, =  0,  which  implies  that the  shadow  value  of each  quasi-fixed
input does  not change  over  time.
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(8)  V(z,  p,  w,  R,  r,  t)  =  [p'  w']  Ap [z]  +  [R'][BR]-'[z] +  [p 1 '2']CPR[R'2]
FGTP1
+ [R1/ 2']DRR[R1/ 2] + [pT]Ep[p]+  T  GTW  [p  w  R].
LG TR I
In  equation  (8),  p  is  the output  price;  w  is  the input  price  vector;  R is  the  quasi-fixed
input rental  price vector;  z is the quasi-fixed input vector;  T is a time-trend variable;  and
Apz,  Az,  Brz, CR, DR,  Epp, Gtp,  Gt,  and GTR  are conformable  parameter  matrices.
Applying  Hotelling's  lemma to  (8)  produces  specifications  for the output supply:
(9)  y(z, p, w, R,  r,  to) =  Ap,(rzt_j  - Z)  +  (r/2)  ' Cpj
j  J  P
and input  demand:
1/2
(10)  a,(z, p,  w, R,  r, to)  =  Aj(j  - rz,_,,)  - r E  Eki,  + E
j  k~i  Wi
R \  1/2
-(r/2)  Co )  +  (1  - rT)G,,
J  \W il
and investment  demand  equations:
(11)  zj(z,  p,  w,  R,  r,  to)  rz,_,  +  E  Bjm  zt-,  +  (r/2) Cpm(R
+ E  Cim  )  +  2  Dj  +  Dmm
+  E  BjmGm(rT - 1),
m
where ij is the rate  of change  of quasi-fixed  input j.
Because  the  generalized  Leontief  value  function  yields  adjustment-cost  expressions
(VK)  that are  linear  in rental  prices,  the investment  demand functions  (11)  are consistent
with  a  multivariable  flexible  accelerator  (MVFA)  interpretation.  Including  additive,  in-
dependently,  and  identically  distributed  disturbance  terms,  the  MVFA  form  of the  in-
vestment  demand functions  are of the form:
(12)  Zi  = (r + Bi)(z i- z*)  + E  Bi(zj  - z*)  +  i =  M(Z  - Z*)  +  ui,
where z*  is the steady  state of the ith quasi-fixed input,  and Z* is a vector of all steady-
state values.
In the terminology of the MVFA model,  the matrix M = (rI + B) is called the speed-
of-adjustment or adjustment-coefficient  matrix,  where  r is the annual interest rate, and I
is  an  n  X  n  identity  matrix  for n quasi-fixed  inputs.  The  parameters  of the  speed-of-
adjustment  matrix  show  the proportion  each quasi-fixed  input  adjusts  towards  its long-
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run equilibrium in response  to short-run disequilibria  in its own and all other quasi-fixed
input  stocks.  However,  the basic MVFA  specification  in  (12)  only allows for one  of the
three practical  concerns this article  addresses.  Namely,  the investment demand functions
in (12) do produce estimates of the interrelatedness  of investment, but they are symmetric
and  do  not allow for the periods  of no change  in input  stocks  that hysteresis  predicts.
In the  first  stage  of the two-stage  procedure,  the hysteresis  gap  in both  quota invest-
ment and  disinvestment  is  estimated.  Hysteresis  in  quota is likely  to  be significant  be-
cause  prolonged  periods  of no change  in quota holdings occur often in the Alberta data.
In  fact,  40%  of  the dairy  farms  did  not change  their  quota license  holdings  from  one
year to the next.  Consequently,  ordinary least squares estimates  of the system parameters
are biased  due  to the censored  quota investment  data (Amemiya,  p.  367).
Rosett  develops  an approach to solve  a similar estimation problem.  In his case, Rosett
attempts  to  explain  the  observation  that  small changes  in  financial  asset yields  do not
appear to cause the expected changes  in holdings.  As a result of the costs of buying and
selling  financial  assets,  investors  will  wait  until  the  expected  returns  rise  above  their
required  (or threshold)  level  before investment  occurs,  or  fall  below  the  disinvestment
threshold  before  assets  are  sold.  Similar  to  the  hysteresis  result,  therefore,  returns  can
vary within  a wide  range before  actual  investment changes. 8 Whereas  Rosett's approach
estimates  the range  of returns  over  which  no change  in holdings  occurs,  or  the option
value,  it is the quantity  effect that  is of interest here.
The theoretical  model  above  estimates  the  size  of the  option  value  in  terms  of the
cost-of-adjustment  parameters.  Investment  will  only  be positive  when  the  discounted
value  of  all  future  net  revenues  are  greater than  the  sunk  costs  of investing  today.  In
terms of the quota license cost-of-adjustment  model, this is simply the condition that the
price of quota licenses must be greater than  the annualized  equilibrium cost of adjusting
quota:
(13)  Rzq  Vqr.
However,  the condition  for investing  in quota licenses under  sunk costs and  uncertainty
must include  the  option value:
b
(14)  Rzq  (b  Vzqr.
Because the option  value is unobservable,  estimates of the effect  of hysteresis  use the
quantity  dependent  investment  demand  equations  to  indirectly  measure  the  size  of the
effect.  Estimation  of  this  effect  requires  partitioning  the  cost-of-adjustment  model  into
regimes  of investment,  no  investment,  and disinvestment.  Specifically,  quota investment
can  be  either  negative,  positive,  or zero  depending  upon  whether  the return  to  holding
quota is (a)  less than the total cost of selling  quota holdings net of the option value,  (b)
greater  than  the full  costs  of investing,  and  (c)  between  the upper  and lower  boundary
defined  by the option  values.  In terms of figure  1, the latter  case means  that returns  fall
between H and L. The option  value for investment  is,  therefore,  the difference  between
the intercept of the actual and the desired investment functions. A similar argument holds
for the  value  of an option  to  disinvest.  Because  both option values  result  in a range  of
8 Shonkwiler  and  Taylor  apply  Rosett's method  to explain  the effect  of direct  and indirect costs  of price  changes  on the
observed rigidity  of monthly  FCOJ prices.
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investment inactivity  (hysteresis),  these types of models are known as  "friction"  models
(Maddala). 9
In the dairy  friction model,  the upper and lower values of the dependent variable must
be  estimated.  If al  < 0 represents  a  desired  decrease  in holdings  and  a2 > 0 represents
a desired increase,  then the function that describes the latent desired investment variable
becomes
-a  u  - a  - u < 0;
Zq  - a  - u;  q*-al- u<0
(15  0;  Z* - a, - u  >  0
(15)  =  ;  al  < 0; a, > 0,
>  Zq  - a  - u;
qZ  2  U;  q 2 a  - uZ >  0
where iq is the actual investment  in quota;  i  the d  dnvtmnt;  n  is  the  desired disinvestment;  and
desired rate  of investment.
Assuming  the  error term  u  is  normally  distributed,  (F is the  unit-normal  cumulative
density function and  (b is the probability  density function,  so the probability  function for
the  above problem  is
(16)  Prob(zq >  x,  x >  0  x)  = Prob(z* 2 -a  x >  u)
,  _-  a 2 - X
Prob(zq  = 0Ix) = Prob(z* - a, >  u  > Z*-  a)
Prob(x < 0, x  > zqlx)  = Prob(/z-q  a  - a  x < u)  =  1 - al-  ).
Assuming  that  the effect  of hysteresis,  as measured  by the  al  parameters,  is the same
for  each  observation,  the likelihood function for the dairy  friction model is
=  Z  qlk  +  )  (a2  - qal
k  or  a,  x
H1  (1)¢(2m  - Zqm +  a2)
(18)  Zqi  = Mi(qi  -Zi)'
for the  ith investment  regime in terms  of the  multivariate  flexible accelerator  model.
Maximizing  the  log  of  (17)  with  respect  to  the  parameters  of  z4  and  ai produces
consistent estimates  of the effect  of hysteresis  on quota investment.  Adjusting  the inter-
9  Note  that the dynamic  dual framework  of  Epstein  requires the policy functions  to be continuous  and differentiable.  The
approach  used  herein is  not  inconsistent  with  this requirement  if the  functions  are  interpreted as  the result  of a  two-stage
optimization  procedure.  In a similar model of asymmetrical  investment demand,  Chang  and Stefanou use this justification  to
support  their estimation  method.  Once  the  first-stage  decision  to invest or  disinvest is made,  the functions  estimated  in the
second  stage  are continuous for the subproblem  of how  much to invest  or to disinvest.
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cepts of the quota investment demand  equations in (15) by ai and reestimating the entire
system (9)-(11) for each investment regime constitutes the second stage of the estimation
procedure.  This  method  produces  consistent  estimates  of  the  effect  of hysteresis,  the
asymmetrical  investment  parameters,  and  the  interaction  between  rates  of investment.
Estimating  this  large  number  of parameters,  however,  requires  a  large  data  set.  The
following  section describes  the data used to estimate these three  effects  on dairy invest-
ment in Alberta.
Data and Methods
This study uses observations on a sample of 270 members of the Alberta Milk Producers'
Society (AMPS)  over the  1975-91  period, which provides  a total of 720 time-series  and
cross-sectional  observations. 10 Designed  by  Alberta  Agriculture  to  monitor  changes  in
costs  of production,  the  sample  provides  price  and  quantity  data  on total  milk output,
quasi-fixed  inputs,  and variable  inputs.
Variable  production  inputs  include  forage,  grain  and  concentrates,  and  hired  labor.'l
Dividing each  producer's  reported total  feed  value by the  quantities  fed gives  the price
of forage.  Feed values are available  for both homegrown  and purchased feed, but to keep
the model  as  parsimonious  as  possible,  the  study uses  an  average  forage  cost  variable.
A similar procedure  provides  the price and quantity  of grain and concentrates.  The  sam-
ple producers  report the  wages paid for hired labor but do not provide sufficient data to
adjust the labor variable  for training or experience.  Because of the geographical diversity
in  a  large  province  such  as  Alberta  and  the  marked  differences  in  local  feed  markets,
substantial cross-sectional  and time-series  price  variation  exists.
Quasi-fixed inputs  include  the amount  of family  labor,  the value of capital structures,
the  stock of quota  licenses,  and  the  size  of the  "effective"  dairy  herd.  Family labor  is
quasi-fixed  because  of the social  difficulties  of disinvestment  and  the biological  lags in
investing  in more  family members.  Previous  empirical  studies of dairy  find  these facts
to  cause  family  labor  to  adjust  slowly  (for  example,  Weersink  and  Howard).  As with
hired  labor,  farmers  report  the  wages paid  to  family  members  but  do not  indicate  the
amount of unskilled  or child  labor.
Capital  consists  of the value  of buildings  and  equipment  specific  to the  dairy  enter-
prise.  From  the  value  data,  Ball's  method  provides  a  capital  rental  price  series.  This
rental  price  then defines  an annual  flow  of capital  services.
Deflating  cattle  numbers  by  an  index  of  genetic  improvement  adjusts  herd  size  for
embodied  technological  change.  The index consists of an average  of all Alberta Holstein
cows'  breed class  average  (BCA) scores for each year.1 2 Although it would be preferable
to  use  an  index  that  is  independent  of  actual  milking  performance,  as  in  Howard  and
Shumway  (1988),  this  index is  the only  one  available  on  a consistent basis  throughout
the sample period.  The cattle rental price is derived with Howard  and Shumway's (1988)
method.  Their  approach  consists  of calculating  the  annual  rental  price  that  equates  the
10  This panel  is unbalanced  in the  sense that  producers  remain  in the sample  for an average  of four years.  This  turnover
is due both to industry  exit and the farmer's  choice  to stop participation.  Despite this fact, Alberta Agriculture  officials select
replacements  in order  to maintain  the stratification  of the sample by  both region  and farm  size.
1 Forage  consists of hay,  silage,  and an  estimate  of the value  of pasture  consumed.
12 The  breed class  average is  itself a national  average  production  index for all  cattle of that breed and  age.  A  provincial
average  BCA is,  therefore,  an  average  BCA score.
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cost of buying a heifer to be milked for three  lactations and then  sold into slaughter and
renting  her for three  lactations.
Quota  licenses  are  quasi-fixed  because  of the  aforementioned  illiquidities  build into
its exchange.  Multiplying  the annual  average weighted-average  cost of capital across  all
producers by the prevailing  fluid quota price provides an annual quota rental price  series.
Although the fluid milk price is formula  determined, significant  output price  variation
still exists  as  producers  ship  milk  of differing  fat content.  This  fact  and  the  significant
regional  variation  in  feed,  labor,  and  cattle  prices  provide  sufficient  price  variation  to
allow  dual  estimation  with  pooled  cross-sectional  and  time-series  data.  However,  it is
necessary to assume  a constant cross-sectional  effect across  producers in order to ensure
convergence  of the entire  model.
Duality  requires  several  other  restrictive  conditions  be  met.  Namely,  duality requires
the  value  function  to  be  linearly  homogeneous  and  concave  in  the  quasi-fixed  inputs.
The generalized Leontief functional form automatically  satisfies both of these conditions.
Empirical  tests of the remaining  restrictions  use the initial form  of the model  as in  (9)-
(11)  to  evaluate  the symmetry,  convexity,  and monotonicity  of the value function.  Sym-
metry in prices requires  that Di  = Dji and Eij  = Ei for all i and j. Maintaining symmetry
as  the  null hypothesis,  Gallant  and  Jorgenson's  quasi-likelihood  ratio  method  produces
a  chi-squared  test  statistic  of  25.324.  With  twelve  degrees  of freedom,  the  critical chi-
squared  value at  a  1% level  is  26.217.  Although  this test rejects  symmetry  at the usual
level  of  significance  (5%),  subsequent  estimates  maintain  symmetry  to  maintain  theo-
retical  consistency.
Monotonicity  requires  the value  function  to  be  increasing  in  output  price  (Vp  >  0),
decreasing  in variable  input prices  (Vwi  < 0),  decreasing  in quasi-fixed input rental  rates
(VRi  <  0),  increasing  in  quasi-fixed  input  stocks  when  investment  is  positive  (Vzi  > 0;
Zi > 0),  and  decreasing  in  quasi-fixed input  stocks  when investment  is negative  (Vi <
0; Zi < 0).  Monotonicity  in  variable  input prices,  output prices,  and  quasi-fixed  input
stocks  is  met  by  all  observations,  while  violations  occur  in  approximately  4%  of  the
observations  of  VRi.
Convexity  in prices  requires  all  elements  of the C matrix to  be negative  (Ci  < 0 for
all i, j) and  the off-diagonal  elements of the D and E matrices to be  negative  (Dy,  Ei  <
O for all  i #  j).  The  model does  not converge  with  the imposition  of convexity,  but of
the twenty-eight  parameters  involved,  only three  violations  of convexity  are  statistically
significant on an individual basis. As a result of these convergence  problems, subsequent
estimates  maintain  only  symmetry  in prices.  Convergence  also requires  restricting  the
technical  change  coefficients  to  be equal  across  all equations.
Estimating  the  first-stage  friction  model  uses  the  maximum-likelihood  procedure  in
TSP. In the  second  stage,  estimating  the  full dynamic  system,  including  the  investment
demand  equations,  uses the nonlinear three-stage  least squares procedure  in TSP. Simul-
taneous  estimation  is  necessary  because  each  input's  rate  of investment  appears  on the
right-hand side of all other investment  equations. The next section presents  and discusses
the results  of this  estimation.
Results  and Discussion
Table  1 presents the results of testing for symmetry of the investment parameters between
investment,  disinvestment,  and  no  change  in  quasi-fixed  input  stocks.  Statistical  tests
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Table  1.  Tests for Alberta Fluid Milk  Quota Investment  Symmetry:  1975-91
Null hypothesis:
Ho:  Parameters  for nonzero quota adjustment equal  full set  parameters
X
2 =  298.4509*
Ho:  Parameters  for zero quota adjustment  equal full data set parameters
X
2 =  298.4509*
Ho:  Parameters  for negative  and positive  quota  adjustment  are equal
X
2 =  337.2403*
Ho:  Parameters  for negative  quota adjustment equal  full data set parameters
X
2 =  372.4590*
Ho:  Parameters  for positive  quota adjustment equal  full data set parameters
X
2 =  709.6993*
Note:  Asterisk  denotes  significance  at the  5%  level.  For each test,  there  are  69  degrees  of freedom  so
the  critical  chi-squared value  is 93.52.
reject the null hypothesis  that the investment  demand parameters  are the  same for quota
investment  and disinvestment.  The firsthe  set of tests consists of modified  Chow tests that
use  the  quasi-likelihood  ratio  method  of Gallant  and  Jorgensen.  With  the  Gallant  and
Jorgensen method,  the  difference between the three-stage  least squares distance function
under the  null and  alternative  hypotheses  is  chi-squared  distributed.  Alternatives  to  the
null  hypothesis  of equal  parameters  in  every  regime  include  parameter  differences  by
positive  license  investment,  negative  investment,  or no change  in license  holdings.  The
number  of parameters  that  are  left  to  vary  between  the  two  investment  regimes  deter-
mines  the  number  of degrees  of freedom.  Given  that  there  are  69  parameters  in  the
model,  the critical  chi-squared  value  for each  test,  assuming  69  degrees  of freedom,  is
93.52.  Clearly,  these tests reject  the null hypothesis of parameter  equality  in each case.
The first-stage  maximum-likelihood  estimates provide a second  (joint) test of the fric-
tion model specification  and the  significance of the hysteresis effect.  If the deviations of
actual  contraction  or  expansion  from  their  desired  levels  (a,  and  a2)  are  statistically
significant,  then  the  friction  model  does  indeed  capture  the  effect  of hysteresis.  The
maximum-likelihood  estimate of a , the amount by which desired quota divestiture must
fall below  zero before  actual  quota license  selling  occurs,  is  -135.136  with a  t-statistic
of -3.66.  On  the  other hand,  the amount  by  which  desired purchases  must rise  above
zero  before  investing  in  quota  licenses  (a2)  is  37.309  with  a  t-statistic  of  2.02.  Given
that the average  fluid quota holding in  the sample for  1991  is only  650 liters,  hysteresis
in Alberta  dairy  is not only statistically but also  economically  significant.
In other words,  hysteresis causes the full-cost quota investment curve (IH)  to rise above
the  traditional  curve  by  5.7%,  while  quota  disinvestments  average  almost 21%  below
what the traditional model predicts.  In other words, producers  are reluctant to sell quota
licenses that they will find difficult to reacquire,  should the need arise. Because producers
retain their quota licenses,  they must maintain production  sufficient to fill their quota.  If
they do not, their quota will revert to the board.l3 While the first-stage  estimates provide
evidence  of hysteresis  in quota  investment,  the  second-stage  estimates  show  the  effect
of quota on investments in other quasi-fixed inputs. Such interactions  may indeed distort
investment  more than the hysteresis  effect of quota.
13  This prediction of the model agrees with casual observation  of producer behavior.  Often, producers will maintain  a given
level of production,  or even  postpone  exit from the industry,  based upon  speculation over quota prices.
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Table  2.  Investment  Substitution Matrix under Fluid Milk Quota Expansion
Disequilibrium  Variable
Capital  Quota  Cattle  Family  Labor
Response  variable:
Capital  -0.036*  -0.021**  0.002*  0.001
(-2.215)  (-4.994)  (2.554)  (0.742)
Quota  -0.275**  -0.065**  0.005*  0.007*
(-4.363)  (-4.095)  (2.254)  (2.091)
Cattle  2.538**  0.416*  -0.035**  0.174**
(5.402)  (2.526)  (-8.896)  (9.216)
Family  labor  -2.027**  -0.666**  0.133**  -0.122**
(-3.500)  (-4.592)  (8.672)  (-11.303)
Note:  Two  asterisks  indicate  significance  at  the  1% level  and  single  asterisk  indicates  significance  at
the  5%  level. A  negative  off-diagonal  coefficient  indicates  a complementary  relationship,  while  a pos-
itive coefficient  indicates  a  substitute relationship.  The  numbers in parentheses  are  t-values.
Details  of the parameter estimates  of the full model are available in Richards,  so this
discussion  concerns  only the speed-of-adjustment parameters.  Tables  2 and 3  present the
parameter estimates for the regimes of quota investment  and disinvestment,  respectively.
In these  tables,  the  off-diagonal  elements  indicate whether  the inputs  are dynamic  sub-
stitutes  or complements.  Specifically,  quasi-fixed  inputs are dynamic  substitutes  if posi-
tive  investment  in  one  causes  a  negative  adjustment  in  the  other  and  vice  versa  for
complements.14 In  terms  of the  empirical  model,  inputs  i  and j  are  substitutes  if  it  is
found that the Bi  parameter in the speed-of-adjustment  matrix is positive.  Conversely, if
Bi, is negative,  the inputs  are dynamic complements.
Given  a constant rate  of discount of 8%,  capital  adjusts  away  from its long-run equi-
librium at a  rate of 4.4%  per year when  quota holdings  are increasing.  In other words,
14  This definition is not directly analogous  to static  theory. In terms of adjustment  costs, if the  Vi element of the B
-1  matrix
is positive,  then  the cost  of adjusting  i rises  in the price  of j-a  complementary  relationship. However,  this may lead  to a
positive Bij element,  defined  as substitutes in terms of quantity  movements.
Table 3.  Investment Substitution Matrix under Fluid Milk  Quota Contraction
Disequilibrium  Variable
Capital  Quota  Cattle  Family Labor
Response  variable:
Capital  0.005  0.017*  -0.003**  0.006**
(1.434)  (1.837)  (-3.673)  (4.487)
Quota  0.014  -0.275**  0.015**  0.007
(1.369)  (-4.625)  (2.825)  (0.851)
Cattle  0.145  1.003*  -0.127**  0.209**
(1.266)  (2.136)  (-4.277)  (5.592)
Family  labor  -0.238  -0.652*  0.132**  -0.295**
(-  1.517)  (-1.816)  (5.377)  (-9.593)
Note:  Refer to table 2 footnote.
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when quota is bought and when the stock of capital is less than desired, the capital stock
falls  rather than rises  as we  would expect in a  static model.  The  Bkq parameter indicates
quota's  effect  on the  net  rate  of capital  adjustment.  The  Bkq  value  of  -2.1%  suggests
that capital  and quota are  dynamic complements-a  rise in quota investment  will cause
the  rate  of capital  investment  to  rise.  On  the other  hand, quota  disinvestment  does  not
affect  the rate  of capital adjustment  (table 3)-a finding  that provides  indirect evidence
of fixity  in  capital holdings.
Under  quota expansion,  the  rate  of quota  adjustment  (r  +  Bqq)  indicates  that  quota
adjusts  away  from the long-run  equilibrium  at a  rate  of 1.5% per  year. Further,  a weak
substitute  relationship  with  both  cattle  and  family  labor  supports  the  movement  away
from  the  steady  state.  However,  the  strength  of the  complementary  relationship  with
capital  causes  the  net  adjustment  of quota  to  be  25%  towards  the  equilibrium.  When
selling  quota,  producers  move  towards  the  desired  stock level  at  a  rate  of  19.5%  per
year.  In  this  case,  the  complementary  effect  disappears,  and  quota  adjustments  move
toward the steady  state.
Notice  further  that  quota's  effect  on investment  in  capital  is  not  symmetric  for in-
vestments  and  disinvestments.  Whereas  quota  expansions  support  the  growth  of farm
capital,  quota disinvestments  do  not affect the rate  of capital adjustment  and vice versa.
Preliminary  estimates  with  a  continuous  quota  investment  model,  also  reported  in
Richards,  show that the cattle own speed-of-adjustment parameter  is only 0.8%  at an 8%
interest rate-herd  size  responds  very  slowly  to disequilibria  in  current  herd  size. Fur-
thermore, the interaction effect of quota license adjustment causes the cattle herd to adjust
31%  per  year  away  from the  long-run  equilibrium.  The adjustment  parameters  in  table
2  indicate  that,  when  quota  license  investment  is  positive,  herd  sizes  adjust  3.5%  per
year towards the optimal,  but the  substitute relationship with  quota leaves  the herd 38%
further away from the steady-state herd size.1 5 Similar substitute relationships  with family
labor  and  capital  further  slow  the  adjustment  of the  cattle  herd.  These results  suggest
that the introduction  of supply  management,  which  causes producers  to invest in  quota
licenses,  significantly  distorts  the pattern of cattle  investment.
On  the  other  hand,  when  quota  license  investment  is  negative,  herds  move  toward
their long-run  optimum by 4.7%  per year.  Similar  to  the case  of expansion,  quota  sub-
stitution slows herd size adjustments considerably.  In fact, the effects of quota and family
labor,  taken  together,  are sufficiently  strong  to  raise  herd  sizes.  This  phenomenon  may
reflect further  institutional problems  with trading  fluid quotas.  Since the sample does not
include producers that completely  sell out, this model measures only incremental changes
in quota holdings.  With  the rapid rise in fluid quota values  throughout  the  1980s, many
producers  sold fluid quota and bought industrial  or market share  quota. Because the law
of one price often  does not hold  across  the fluid and  market share  quota markets,  these
arbitrageurs  were  able  to  profit  from  moving  from  the  fluid  to  the  industrial  market.
Taking  advantage  of these  opportunities  to  arbitrage  the  two  markets,  the  proceeds  of
these transactions  were often used to expand herd size and sell more milk into the lower
price industrial market. While these results imply that quota investment worsens the fixity
of dairy  cattle  in Alberta,  the  same argument  does  not hold  for family labor.
Many believe that quota licenses  provide producers with a  golden handshake-a store
1 5 Note that herd  size is defined as  the number of effective cattle  or cattle  numbers of a standard genetic  ability to produce
milk,  using  1975  as a base  period.
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of value  to  ease  their  exit  from  the  industry.  The  results  here  support  this  argument.
Tables  2 and  3 provide  evidence  to  suggest  that quota  acquisitions  are  associated with
increasing  family  labor usage  while selling  hastens  exit.  For example,  the  family labor
of farmers that purchase quota adjusts  independent of the other inputs at  a rate of  12.2%
per  year,  while  those  selling  licenses  have  a  labor  adjustment  rate  of  21.5%  per year.
Family  labor's  interaction  with  quota  causes  adjustments  to  accelerate  by  65%,  while
interactions  with  herd  size  causes  adjustments  to  slow  by  13%.  This  latter  result  is
precisely  what the  golden  handshake  effect predicts-when  quota is  sold,  family  labor
exits  as  well.
Conclusions
This  study  shows  that  supply  management  in  the  Alberta  dairy  industry  affects  farm
production  decisions  in  two  ways.  First,  uncertainty  in the  returns  to dairy  production,
in combination  with the sunk  costs involved  in adjusting  quota stocks, creates  an option
value.  This option value is the value of waiting to make an investment in quota licenses.
Standard  capital  budgeting  criteria,  investing  when  the net  present  value  of the project
is  positive,  are  no  longer  valid  as  returns  must  now  cover  the  cost  of investment  plus
the option'value. Postponing  quota investment in the hopes that returns either rise above
the  higher threshold,  or  fall  below  the  lower,  is responsible  for hysteresis  arising  with
respect to adjustments  in  quota licenses.  In practical terms,  hysteresis  means that quota,
once  purchased,  will  not be  sold  as  readily  as  a  neoclassical  model  would predict.  In
fact,  this  study  shows  that  desired  quota  purchases  must rise  137  liters  above  current
levels  before  purchases  are  made  or fall  35  liters below  prevailing  levels  before  dives-
titure occurs.
Second,  the  sensitivity of investment  to input prices for capital,  quota licenses, cattle,
and  family  labor  differs  between  investment  and  disinvestment.  For  example  quota  in-
vestment  causes capital  to  adjust more  rapidly,  while quota investment  slows herd  size
adjustments.  In fact,  these distortions  to  cattle  investment  are  so strong  that  they  cause
herd  size to expand  when  a static  model would  suggest that they  should  contract.
These  results  imply  that  supply  management  is likely  to  adversely  affect  dairy  effi-
ciency.  Dairy regulators,  and  any  other  regulators  that  use  supply  management  should
consider  these  unintended  economic  effects  when  assessing  the  cost  of their programs.
First,  despite  the  golden  handshake  effect,  hysteresis  creates  overinvestment  in Alberta
dairy.  Inputs  that  would  otherwise  exit  the  industry,  instead,  remain  in  production  in
hopes  of better  times.  Given  the  rise  in  quota  values  in  recent  years,  quota  investors
appear  to  expect  much  better  times  despite  a  series  of negative  GATT rulings  against
supply  management,  the signing  of the GATT  agreement,  and the passage  of NAFTA.
Moreover,  because the policy causes  producers to invest in an input whose only value
is in capturing  rents, farmers  invest less to increase the physical productivity of the firm.
As  a  result,  overinvestment  in  dairy  cattle  likely  leads to  lower productivity  growth  in
Alberta  dairy.  Given  the newly  competitive  dairy  market  promised  for North America,
the Alberta  dairy industry  could find itself unable  to compete  with imported milk prod-
ucts  and many of the least  efficient  producers  would be forced  from the industry.
These  results  apply  to  many  industries  besides  dairy.  Many  industries  have  output
regulations  through  some  type of licensing  program-the  forest industry,  for example.
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Once  thought to be neutral  in  their effect  on productivity,  efficiency,  and investment  as
simply rent transfer devices,  stumpage fees can worsen any existing hysteresis in forestry
investments.  The airline  industry represents  another interesting example  of this problem.
The purchase  of landing rights  at  designated  airports  is  a form of output  regulation that
represents  a significant  investment  by airline  companies.  Given the history of firms that
hold  airport rights  far  beyond  the point  of zero  returns,  an  empirical  determination  of
hysteresis  in  this industry would  not be  surprising.
[Received August 1994; final version received December 1995.]
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